Attentional deployment is a primary strategy individuals use to regulate emotion. In 2 experiments, a measure of an individual's ability to deploy attention toward and away from emotional mental representations was developed. This measure of attentional control capacity for emotion adapted an explicitcuing task switching paradigm in which participants had to shift between emotional and neutral mental sets. Experiment 1 (N ϭ 118) showed that those higher in trait anxiety and worrisome thoughts took longer to switch from a neutral to an emotional mental set. In Experiment 2 (N ϭ 42), participants were given a stressful anagram task, and those who switched more efficiently from a neutral set to an emotional set were more frustrated by the stressful task. In addition, those who switched more efficiently from an emotional set to a neutral set persisted longer on the stressful task. These findings provide an initial step toward identifying possible mechanisms through which individuals apply attentional control to emotional mental representations to regulate emotion.
Often we encounter an anxiety-provoking or frustrating task that we must complete, whether it be speaking in public or simply clearing annoying spam from our e-mail box. Yet, most people are able to keep their emotions in check effectively enough to complete these tasks. Individuals have an extraordinary capacity to regulate emotion, and employ numerous strategies that determine the magnitude of its impact. One of the primary strategies individuals employ to regulate emotion is attentional deployment (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2005) .
Attentional deployment is one of the first emotion regulation processes to appear in development and continues to be used in late adulthood (Mather et al., 2004; Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Rothbart & Sheese, 2007) . Infants deploy their attention by shifting their gaze away from an emotion-eliciting stimulus to reduce their emotional reactivity (Rothbart & Sheese, 2007) . According to socioemotional selectivity theory, older adults preferentially deploy their attention away from negative stimuli and toward positive stimuli as a goal-directed behavior to effectively regulate emotion (Carstensen, 1995; Knight et al., 2007; Mather & Carstensen, 2005) . Recently, Johnson (2009) gave younger adults a goal to focus on positive faces and found that this predicted reduced frustration in reaction to a subsequent stressful task.
There is extensive evidence in the anxiety literature to suggest that dysregulation of attentional deployment processes is fundamental to the etiology and maintenance of clinical and nonclinical anxiety (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & IJzendoorn, 2007, and MacLeod, 2005 , for reviews). The primary finding in this literature is that individuals high in anxiety selectively deploy attention toward threatening or negative stimuli. The most common paradigm used to assess this attentional bias toward threat is the dot-probe paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) . In the picture version of this task, individuals are first presented with two pictures simultaneously; one is a negative picture and the other is emotionally neutral. These pictures are then immediately replaced by a simple probe that appears behind just one of the pictures. The faster a participant responds to the probe following the negative picture, compared to the neutral picture, the stronger the attentional bias toward negative stimuli. This task relies on spatial orientation attentional processes through which the individual reveals his or her attentional deployment processes by orienting toward negative stimuli more than neutral or positive stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004; Rohner, 2002) .
The emotional spatial-cuing task is also designed to assess attentional deployment in anxious individuals (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001) . In this task, a single face (e.g., an angry face) is presented as a cue for a simple probe. The subsequent probe can appear either in the same location as the cue or on the opposite side of screen. This task relies on spatial attentional control processes. Individuals who take longer to disengage attention from the location of an angry face cue when the probe appears in the opposite screen location are interpreted as having deployed a disproportionate amount of attention toward the angry face. Fox et al. (2001) found that individuals high in state anxiety took significantly longer to disengage attention from an angry face, compared with those low in state anxiety (see Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002 , for similar results with the inhibition of return paradigm). Compton (2000) employed the emotional spatial-cuing task and studied the ability to regulate emotion in response to a distressing film. She showed that those who were more efficient at disengaging spatial attention from threat subsequently responded with less negative affect to a distressing film.
Studies of attentional control and emotion tend to focus on visuospatial attention processes. In contrast, numerous theories of emotional dysregulation emphasize attentional control deficits for emotional imagery and thought content. There are numerous groups of individuals who exhibit a deficient ability to deploy attention away from emotional thought content and imagery, including those who are high in trait anxiety, neuroticism, depressive rumination, and clinical anxiety patients (Davis & NolenHoeksema, 2000; Robinson, Wilkowski, Kirkeby, & Meier, 2006; Sarason, 1986; Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006; Watkins & Mason, 2002) . Theories of nonclinical and clinical anxiety purport that intrusive worrisome thoughts are a primary source of anxiety (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Sarason, 1986; Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006) . The attentional control theory of nonclinical anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007) purports that highanxious individuals suffer from a general attentional control deficit, especially in mental set-shifting and inhibition. Sibrava and Borkovec's (2006) cognitive avoidance theory of clinical anxiety suggests that individuals high in anxiety avoid attention to emotional imagery by increasing their worrisome thoughts. Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) hypothesized that people with depressive rumination exhibit an "attentional inflexibility," that is, a deficient ability to shift attention away from negative ruminative thoughts. Recently, Whitmer and Banich (2007) directly linked multiple types of rumination to mental set-shifting ability and inhibition. Those who were more efficient at shifting between tasks or inhibiting previous mental sets exhibited lower levels of rumination. In sum, these studies suggest that an individual's ability to apply attentional control to emotional mental representations is critical to effective emotion regulation.
Although crucial to our understanding of emotional dysregulation, the literature lacks a measure of one's ability to shift attention toward and away from emotional mental sets. As a result, the primary goal of this study was to develop such a measure and determine whether this ability predicts emotion regulation effectiveness. Individual differences in this ability were measured by adapting a task-switching paradigm and measuring the costs of switching from an emotional mental set to a neutral mental set and from a neutral set to an emotional set (Johnson, in press ). This measure of emotional attention set-shifting assesses attentional control capacity for emotional representations (ACCE). The task measuring ACCE capitalizes on the theoretically rich area of task switching (Monsell, 2003) . Generally, it takes more time to switch between tasks than to perform the same task repeatedly. The additional time required to switch between tasks has been termed switch cost. Switch cost is thought to reflect multiple executive processes required to reconfigure a task set and other attentional processes unrelated to task set reconfiguration (Logan, 2003; Monsell, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001) . Accordingly, individual differences in emotional attention set-shifting were measured by the magnitude of switch cost.
The cognitive and social neuroscience literatures offer important insight into how emotional attention set-shifting may be related to emotion regulation (Mitchell et al., 2008; Mitchell, Richell, Leonard, & Blair, 2006; Vythilingam et al., 2007; Winston, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2003; Winston, Strange, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2002; Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson, & Cohen, 2006) . In one functional MRI study, participants were given compound stimuli that consisted of faces on which a word was superimposed (Yeung et al., 2006) . They had to switch between judging the gender of the face and the number of syllables of the word on that face. Yeung et al. (2006) found that while individuals performed the relevant task, activity in the brain regions selective for the currently irrelevant task predicted the magnitude of the switch cost. For example, participants exhibited a larger switch cost of switching from a gender to syllable judgment when their brain activity indicated they failed to disengage the gender mental set during the syllable judgment. Similarly, Winston et al. (2003) showed that brain regions that respond to emotional expressions (i.e., amygdala and fusiform gyrus) were active whether participants were making an emotionally neutral judgment or an emotionally directed judgment (see also Winston et al., 2002) .
These findings suggest two general predictions for the relationship between emotional attention set-shifting and emotion regulation. First, individuals with less effective emotional attentional control may exhibit difficulty disengaging the emotional mental set and reconfiguring to the neutral set. This will result in a larger switch cost for the emotional to neutral task switch. Similarly, if those with less effective emotional attentional control have difficulty disengaging the emotional mental set, then switching from a neutral set back to an emotional set should be facilitated. This will be reflected in a reduced neutral to emotional mental set switch cost.
This article reports two experiments that investigated the relationship between emotional attention set-shifting (measuring ACCE) and emotion regulation effectiveness. Experiment 1 examined whether ACCE is related to both trait anxiety and current levels of worrisome thoughts. Attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) suggests that individuals higher in anxiety should exhibit a deficit in switching ability, particularly in disengaging attention from emotional stimuli. As a result, individuals higher in anxiety should exhibit an increased emotional to neutral switch cost and a reduced neutral to emotional switch cost. In contrast, Sibrava and Borkovec's (2006) cognitive avoidance theory predicts that individuals higher in anxiety avoid attention to emotional imagery and, therefore, should exhibit an increased neutral to emotional switch cost and a reduced emotional to neutral switch cost. To distinguish ACCE from general attentional control capacity, working memory capacity (WMC) was also measured. Individual differences in attentional control capacity have been captured well by WMC as measured by complex span (Unsworth & Engle, 2007) . Those higher in WMC demonstrate superior inhibition ability (Kane & Engle, 2003; Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001) , switching ability (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004) , and updating ability (Oberauer, 2005) .
Experiment 2 examined whether emotional attention set-shifting predicts an individual's ability to regulate emotion. Participants were given a stressful anagram task with insoluble and highly difficult anagrams. Effective emotion regulation was indexed by both state anxiety and frustration in response to the anagram task and by the amount of time the participant persisted on the anagram task. Objective measures of behavior provide important convergent (or divergent) information regarding the effectiveness of emotion regulation. Baumeister, Vohs, and Funder (2007) ob-served that although examining inner cognitive and experiential processes are important in psychology, behavior should be just as important, and yet it is rarely measured. In addition, the experiential, physiological, and behavioral outcomes of emotion and emotion regulation are often loosely coupled and sometimes discrepant (Bradley & Lang, 2000; Hubert & de Jong-Meyer, 1990; Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006; Mauss, Levensen, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005) . Therefore, both self-report and behavioral outcomes were assessed to gain a more complete picture of emotion regulation effectiveness.
Experiment 1

Method Participants
Participants (N ϭ 118) volunteered to participate in the study for course credit. All participants were undergraduate psychology students and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision (80 women, age: M ϭ 19.21 years, SD ϭ 2.32).
Materials
ACCE task (Johnson, in press ). This task adapted the explicitcuing task switching paradigm to measure an individual's ability to shift attention between emotional and neutral mental sets. Participants performed one of two judgments on a compound stimulus that consisted of a face with a shape centered between the eyes. Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the task and trial types. For the emotional judgment, participants were to identify the emotional expression on the face that could be happy, angry, or neutral. For the neutral judgment, participants were to identify the type of shape centered between the eyes on the face, which could be a circle, square, or triangle. Prior to seeing a face with a shape on it, the participant was shown either a solid bar or a patterned bar on the computer screen. A solid bar served as a cue to the participant to attend and respond to the emotional expression of the face (emotional mental set), whereas a patterned bar cued the participant to attend and respond to the type of shape between the eyes of the face (neutral mental set). Stimuli were two individuals from the MacBrain Face Stimulus Set, each with happy, angry, and neutral facial expressions (Tottenham, Borscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus, & Nelson, 2002 ) that were matched for valence and intensity.
Moderators: General attentional control capacity, trait anxiety, and worry. General attentional control capacity was assessed using a computerized version of the operation span task, called automated operation span (AOSPAN; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) . This task possesses good internal consistency (␣ ϭ .78) and test-retest reliability (.83). In this task, participants are presented with a letter followed by a two-operation mathematical problem. The task varies the number of letters for memorization, and subsequent recall of the letters must be in order. High span scores are achieved by holding a greater number of letters in Figure 1 . A schematic of the attentional control capacity for emotion (ACCE) task. Each trial began with a cue that informed the participant which judgment to make, the cue remained on the screen for either 200 ms or 1,500 ms until it was replaced by the stimulus on which the participant was to make a judgment. Then, a blank screen was presented for an intertrial interval of 500 ms and the next trial began. The bottom section of the depiction for each task shows how each type of switch cost was calculated. NN ϭ neutral-neutral repetitions; EE ϭ emotion-emotion repetitions; NE ϭ neutral-emotion switches; EN ϭ emotion-neutral switches; RT ϭ reaction time. See text for details. Reprinted with permission from Research Network on Early Experience and Brain Development at Macbrain. memory, while maintaining a prespecified math accuracy level (85% or higher). Each trial is paced so that a participant can spend only a fixed amount of time on a math problem. Each participant sets his or her own mathematical processing pace when performing the math task alone. The average time an individual spends on a math problem plus 2.5 standard deviations is set as the time limit for the math portion of the subsequent dual-task trials. For additional details regarding AOSPAN's task structure, scoring, and validity, see Unsworth et al. (2005) .
Trait anxiety was measured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) . The degree to which an individual experiences worrisome thoughts was measured using the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (Matthews et al., 1999) .
Procedure
Participants completed the measures in the following order: trait anxiety scale, worrisome thoughts scale, AOSPAN, and the ACCE task. For the ACCE task, there were 25 practice trials to learn the response mappings for the emotional judgment that required participants to press the 1, 2, and 3 keys for the happy, angry, and neutral faces, respectively. Immediately prior to each face-shape combination, a solid bar was presented for either 200 ms or 1,500 ms that served to cue the task set. Then, the face-shape combination stimulus was presented until the participant responded or until 5 s had elapsed. Feedback was provided after each response, so that "Correct!" or "Incorrect" was presented for 1,500 ms after each response. If the participant did not respond within 5 s, "No response detected" was presented for 1,500 ms. Then, an intertrial interval of 500 ms elapsed until the next cue was presented and the cycle started again. The cue-to-stimulus interval (CSI) was randomized so that half the CSIs were short (200 ms) and half were long (1,500 ms). The cue remained on screen throughout the CSI because maintaining the presence of the cue until a stimulus is presented places a greater demand on attentional control (Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, & Demanet, 2007) . Verbruggen et al. (2007) showed that maintaining the cue throughout the CSI reduces individuals' self-initiation of a task switch during the CSI, thereby resulting in a greater demand on attentional control.
There were also 25 practice trials where participants learned the response mappings for the shape judgment that required participants to press the 1, 2, and 3 keys for the circle, square, and triangle, respectively. Each of these face-shape combinations was preceded by a patterned bar cue and otherwise was identical to the emotional judgment practice trials. For the final 25 practice trials, participants had to perform both emotional and shape judgments repeatedly and in alternation. Otherwise, these trials were the same as the previous practice trials.
Following the practice trials, test trials were given. To place a greater demand on attentional control, only one third (or 40) of the total 120 test trials were switching trials, and the remaining were repetition trials (Dreisbach & Haider, 2006; Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002; Monsell & Mizon, 2006) . Monsell and Mizon (2006) and Dreisbach and colleagues (2002) showed that when repetition trials are more frequent, there is a greater switch cost compared with when repetition trials are less frequent than switching trials. This suggests a greater demand on attentional control in the frequent repetition trial condition (although see Dreisbach & Haider, 2006 , for discussion of repetition benefit vs. shift trial slowing). It follows that if emotion repetition trials are more frequent than switching trials, it would be more difficult to disengage from emotion and engage a neutral set and easier to disengage a neutral set and engage an emotional set because of proactive interference for an emotional task set (Allport & Wylie, 2000) . The frequent emotion repetition trial manipulation was used because the goal of this study was to investigate attentional control for emotional mental representations, and this maximized the attentional control demand for disengaging an emotional task set. Therefore, the breakdown of the test trials was as follows; 20 neutral-emotion (NE) switching trials, 20 emotion-neutral (EN) switching trials, 60 emotion-emotion (EE) repetition trials, and 20 neutral-neutral (NN) repetition trials. Except for the constraint that the first 10 test trials were emotion judgments, one pseudorandomized order for the different trial types was created and presented to all participants.
In addition, given that the goal of this study was to investigate emotional attention set-shifting, the contribution of participants' reaction to emotional faces during switching was minimized. It is quite possible that the emotional valence of a stimulus also influences the ability to switch between mental sets (as shown in Yeung et al., 2006; Winston et al., 2003) . Therefore, the valence of the face was always neutral for the trial preceding a switching trial and the switching trial. For example, if the participant is first cued to make an emotional judgment and then on the next trial is cued to make a neutral judgment, the faces on both of these trials were neutral. This was the case for all types of switching trials. Therefore, any effects of an increased difficulty in disengaging from an angry face, for example, were minimized in all measures of switch cost. Although this did not completely remove the effects of stimulus valence, this did minimize the effects.
Preliminary Analyses
Prior to data analyses, data were screened for outliers by excluding reaction times (RTs) shorter than 130 ms. In addition, excessively long RTs were screened by excluding RTs longer than 3 standard deviations above an individual's mean RT. This resulted in trimming a small percentage of the data as less than 1% (0.3%) of the total RTs were excluded. In addition, participants were screened to ensure that all were performing above chance levels of accuracy; all met this criterion.
Operationalization of Emotional Attention Set-Shifting Ability
A method commonly used in the task-switching literature was used to operationalize individual differences in set-shifting ability for emotional and neutral mental representations. Switch costs were calculated by computing two difference scores (e.g., Friedman et al., 2006; Monsell, 2003; Verbruggen et al., 2007) . The mean RT for the NN repetition trials was subtracted from the mean RT for the EN switching trials to obtain individual differences in EN switch cost. The mean RT for EE repetition trials was subtracted from the mean RT for NE switching trials to obtain individual differences in NE switch cost. These difference scores should not suffer from low reliability because the components of the difference score were not negatively correlated (Rogosa & Willett, 1983) . The bottom portion of Figure 1 shows how EN switch cost and NE switch cost were calculated for the ACCE task.
It is important to note that each of these switch costs does not represent a single cognitive process; rather, they include all the executive processes required to disengage a previous mental set and engage a different mental set. For example, EN switch cost represents multiple processes required to disengage attention from the emotional mental set and engage attention on the neutral mental set. In addition, because the emotion repetition trials were more frequent, the attentional control demand was increased for an emotional to a neutral task switch and decreased for a neutral to an emotional task switch (Dreisbach & Haider, 2006; Monsell & Mizon, 2006) . Therefore, EN switch cost reflects an increased attentional control demand, and NE switch cost reflects a decreased attentional control demand. The primary goal in this study was to capture individual differences in the ability to switch between emotional and neutral mental representations. Regardless of which precise component processes are involved, EN switch cost requires an individual to both disengage an emotional mental set and engage a neutral set, and NE switch cost requires the individual to both disengage a neutral set and engage an emotional set, thereby capturing the construct of interest. In addition, by making emotion repetition trials more frequent, the emotional set should be more difficult to disengage than the neutral set, thereby placing a greater demand on attentional control for disengaging emotional representations.
Results
Emotional Attention Switch Cost
The purpose of these analyses was to determine (a) whether the ACCE task placed a significant demand on task-switching process, and (b) whether frequent emotion repetition trials increased the cost of switching from an emotional set to a neutral set and decreased the cost of switching from a neutral set to an emotional set.
A multivariate approach to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on RT differences between EE, NN, NE, and EN trials revealed a significant main effect, F(3, 115) ϭ 69.99, p Ͻ .0001. Bonferroni-adjusted contrasts revealed a significant NE switch cost, F(1, 117) ϭ 33.43, p Ͻ .0001, 2 ϭ .222, and a significant EN switch cost, F(1, 117) ϭ 129.82, p Ͻ .0001, 2 ϭ .526. As shown in Figure 2 , these differences could not be explained by a speed-accuracy trade-off because accuracy scores decreased when RTs slowed. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that switching from an emotional set to neutral set (M ϭ 204.66 ms, SD ϭ 195.10) took significantly longer than switching from a neutral set to an emotional set (M ϭ 106.24 ms, SD ϭ 199.60), F(1, 117) ϭ 13.41, p ϭ .0004, 2 ϭ .103. This provides evidence that disengaging an emotional set and engaging a neutral set placed a greater demand on attentional control than the reverse switch.
Moderators: General Attentional Control Capacity, Trait Anxiety, Worry
To test whether general attentional control capacity moderates switch cost, two regressions were performed where each type of switch cost (i.e., EN switch cost and NE switch cost) served as the predictor and AOSPAN served as the criterion variable. This tests whether the magnitude of switch cost was moderated by AOSPAN. Neither switch cost was significantly moderated by AOSPAN ( p ϭ .216, p ϭ .427). This indicates general attentional control capacity could not account for the cost of switching attention between emotional and neutral mental sets. Table 1 summarizes four regressions that tested whether trait anxiety or worry moderates either EN switch cost or NE switch cost, where each of type of switch cost served as a predictor variable and trait anxiety and worry served as the criterion variables. Both trait anxiety and worry significantly moderated NE switch cost so that those higher in trait anxiety and worry had a decreased ability to switch from a neutral mental set to an emotional mental set. The Fisher's z transformation was used on all standardized beta coefficients from all regressions. Bonferronicorrected pairwise comparisons were performed, and none of the coefficients significantly differed. This suggests that while trait anxiety and worry appear to moderate emotional attention switch costs, the effect is nonspecific.
Discussion
The ACCE task measured for the first time, to the author's knowledge, individual differences in emotional attention setshifting ability. Those higher in trait anxiety and worrisome thoughts exhibited increased difficulty in switching from a neutral mental set to an emotional mental set. It is important to note that the switch costs could not be explained by general attentional control capacity. This is important because it supports the idea that the switch costs measured by the ACCE task captured an attentional control capacity for emotional material specifically.
Although this experiment demonstrated that performance on the ACCE task was related to trait anxiety and worry, it remains unclear whether ACCE performance is related to a generalized mechanism of emotion regulation. Therefore, it was important to test whether emotional attention set-shifting predicts emotion regulation effectiveness more directly.
Experiment 2
The purpose of this experiment was to test whether individual differences in the ability to shift between emotional and neutral mental sets are related to the ability to regulate emotion in subjective and objective domains. To place a demand on emotion regulation, participants were given a task that was both anxiety provoking and frustrating. The ability to successfully regulate emotion was operationalized by how long participants persisted on a stressful task and their self-reported emotional reactivity.
Method Participants
Forty-two (30 women) undergraduate psychology students, who had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, volunteered to participate in the study for course credit.
Materials
ACCE task (Johnson, in press) . The ACCE task was identical to that used in Experiment 1, except that the order of the practice trials (i.e., emotional vs. neutral mental sets) was counterbalanced. Trait anxiety was measured using the StateTrait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983) . Participants completed a brief two-item Likert scale questionnaire multiple times throughout the experiment to assess their current feelings of anxiety and frustration. This questionnaire asked participants to rate their anxiety from 1 (not anxious) to 10 (extremely anxious) and frustration from 1 (not frustrated) to 10 (extremely frustrated). This brief questionnaire was given in place of a full scale of state feelings to prevent questionnaire reactivity because they answered these same items multiple times.
Stressful anagram task. The task designed to place a demand on emotion regulation (i.e., elicit frustration and anxiety) was an anagram task in which participants had to unscramble a group of letters to make a single word (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002) . Four anagrams were given and consisted of two insoluble anagrams and two difficult, multisyllable anagrams. To increase the anxiety and frustration elicited by the task, participants were instructed not to write anything down during the task and were informed that they would be asked to recall what strategies they used to solve the anagrams at the end of the session. The primary dependent variable was the total time participants persisted on the anagrams. Those who are better at regulating their emotion should be able to keep from being overwhelmed by frustration and anxiety and should persist longer on the anagram task.
Procedure
Participants completed the measures in the following order: trait anxiety questionnaire, baseline measure of state anxiety and frustration, ACCE task, second measure of state anxiety and frustration, anagram task, and third measure of state anxiety and frustration.
Results and Discussion
Emotional Attention Switch Cost
The effects related to ACCE and switch costs from Experiment 1 were replicated. A multivariate approach to a repeated measures ANOVA on RT differences between EE, NN, NE, and EN trials revealed a significant main effect, F(3, 39) ϭ 29.49, p Ͻ .0001. Bonferroni-adjusted contrasts revealed a significant NE switch cost, F(1, 41) ϭ 11.25, p ϭ .002, 2 ϭ .215, and a significant EN switch cost, F(1, 41) ϭ 54.97, p Ͻ .0001, 2 ϭ .573. These differences could not be explained by a speed-accuracy trade-off because accuracy scores decreased when RTs slowed. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that switching from an emotional set to neutral set (M ϭ 250.30 ms, SD ϭ 218.78) took significantly longer than switching from a neutral set to emotional set (M ϭ 106.56 ms, SD ϭ 205.91), F(1, 41) ϭ 8.60, p ϭ .006, 2 ϭ .173.
Emotional Attention Switch Cost and Emotion Regulation
To test whether the anagram task induced anxiety and frustration, repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on the short test of anxiety and frustration presented just before and after the anagram task. Both anxiety and frustration increased significantly, F(1, 41) ϭ 19.57, p Ͻ .0001, 2 ϭ .323; F(1, 41) ϭ 27.60, p Ͻ .0001, 2 ϭ .402, respectively. Four regressions were performed to test whether the ability to switch between mental sets uniquely predicted state anxiety and frustration in response to the anagram task above and beyond trait anxiety. Neither switch cost predicted state anxiety. However, Table 2 shows that participants who took longer to disengage a neutral set and engage an emotional set were less frustrated in response to the anagram task. Equivalently, those who shifted from a neutral to emotional mental set more quickly were more frustrated. Fisher's z transformation was used on all standardized beta coefficients from the regressions. A pairwise comparison was performed, and the NE switch cost coefficient predicted frustration significantly better compared with EN switch cost (z ϭ 1.91, p Ͻ .05). This supports the idea that those who respond to a stressor with greater levels of frustration may not completely disengage an emotional mental set, thereby making it easier to shift to it from a neutral mental set (Winston et al., 2003; Yeung et al., 2006) . To test whether the ability to switch between emotional and neutral mental sets uniquely predicted persistence on the anagram task above and beyond trait anxiety, two regressions were performed where trait anxiety and each type of switch cost served as predictors and the time spent on the anagram task served as the criterion variable. Table 3 shows that participants with a reduced EN switch cost persisted significantly longer on the anagram task. Fisher's z transformation was used on all standardized beta coefficients from the regressions. A pairwise comparison was performed and revealed no significant difference between the coefficients for each type of switch cost. Figure 3 presents a scatterplot demonstrating that those who more efficiently disengaged an emotional set and reconfigured to a neutral set persisted longer on the anagram task.
General Discussion
Attentional deployment toward and away from emotional material is considered fundamental to emotion regulation (Gross & Thompson, 2007) . However, very little is known about the processes through which emotion is regulated by attentional deployment toward and away from emotional mental representations and thought content.
This study developed a measure of one's ability to deploy attention to emotional mental representations, called attentional control capacity for emotion (ACCE). The ACCE task adapted a task-switching paradigm and required participants to switch between emotional and neutral mental sets. Individual differences in ACCE were measured by the magnitude of switch cost from this emotional attention set-shifting task. This measure represents a significant shift in thinking about switch cost in that it is considered not only an executive control process but also an important individual difference construct in the context of emotion regulation.
In Experiment 1, individuals high in trait anxiety and worrisome thoughts exhibited a difficulty in switching from a neutral to an emotional set. The relationship between ACCE and trait anxiety and worry partially supported Sibrava and Borkovec's (2006) cognitive avoidance theory of anxiety. Sibrava and Borkovec's theory posits that a primary source of anxiety is the constant avoidance of threatening imagery. The results showed that individuals high in anxiety and worry had a deficit in the ability to switch from a neutral to emotional mental set. This finding is consistent with cognitive avoidance theory because it should take longer for high-anxiety individuals to switch to the emotional set if they are attempting to avoid attention to emotional mental representations. However, this particular switch cost could not be statistically differentiated from the other types of switch costs in its relationship to anxiety. Therefore, this explanation should be interpreted cautiously. In addition, the ACCE task did not require participants to disengage attention from threat specifically, but rather from an emotional mental set that was not valence specific. Therefore, the current study could not test Sibrava and Borkovec's theory directly. However, the ACCE framework provides a promising ground for future work testing a primary hypothesis in Sibrava and Borkovec's theory that worriers specifically avoid threatening mental imagery. In addition, these results provide partial support for the hypothesis of Eysenck et al. (2007) because individuals high in anxiety exhibited a generalized switching deficit and the switch costs were not significantly different regarding their relationship to trait anxiety.
The findings connecting ACCE and anxiety highlight a new direction for future research on anxiety. Many theories of anxiety purport that individuals high in anxiety have selective difficultly disengaging attention from threatening material (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Eysenck et al., 2007; Fox et al., 2001; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005) . Future studies should test emotional attention set-shifting for threatening material specifically in high-anxious individuals. Although many studies have confirmed that those high in anxiety have difficultly disengaging visual attention from threatening stimuli, the same hypothesis regarding disengaging attention from a threatening mental set has yet to be tested. The ACCE task appeared to capture a task-switching ability for emotional representations specifically, as opposed to a general switching ability. General attentional control capacity, as measured by WMC, did not moderate the cost of switching between emotional and neutral mental sets. The primary goal in this study was to test whether general attentional control capacity could account for switch cost in the ACCE task. However, this design does not rule out general switching ability as an account of switch cost in ACCE. To further establish the discriminant validity of the ACCE task, it should be compared with an identical switching task without the emotional relevance. Recently, Johnson (in press) designed such a task and has shown that ACCE predicts emotion regulation better than general switching ability.
Experiment 2 supported the importance of attentional deployment in successful regulation of emotion (Gross & Thompson, 2007) . This study also demonstrated a convergence between experiential and behavior domains of emotion regulation (Mauss et al., 2005 (Mauss et al., , 2006 . In the behavior domain, those who were more efficient at disengaging attention from an emotional set persisted significantly longer on the anagram task. In the experiential domain, those who responded to the anagram task with greater levels of frustration switched more efficiently from a neutral to an emotional set. In contrast, in Experiment 1, those higher in trait anxiety exhibited the opposite relationship. This discrepancy suggests that the ability to engage or disengage an emotional set may be adaptive or maladaptive depending on the context and the particular type of emotion being targeted for regulation. Specifically, the strategy to avoid an emotional mental set could be maladaptive when used perseveratively by individuals attempting to regulate anxiety, but adaptive when individuals are trying to regulate transient frustration in an effort to continue working toward a desired goal (e.g., solve an anagram). Consequently, these results suggest that it is more effective to be flexible in one's tendency to engage and disengage emotional information.
The emotional attention set-shifting task was designed to provide both a window into a mechanism of emotion regulation (i.e., attentional deployment) and a measure of individual differences in ACCE. Indeed, individual differences in ACCE were related to trait anxiety, worrisome thoughts, and general emotion regulation effectiveness. However, it is important for future research to determine whether ACCE can be manipulated to affect emotion regulation so that its causal status can be ascertained. In addition, the effects of an induced emotional state on ACCE could also be investigated.
Future studies could investigate the executive processes necessary to successfully complete an emotional task switch including exogenous and endogenous processes. For example, task set reconfiguration is considered an endogenous attentional process, whereas the effect of proactive interference on switch cost is an exogenous process. Therefore, it is likely that switching between emotional and neutral mental sets required both endogenous and exogenous attentional processes (Johnson, in press; Monsell, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al., 2001) . Future studies could determine the degree to which emotional attention set-shifting is driven by exogenous processes and endogenous processes, just as general task-switching theorists have investigated for many years (Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Verbruggen et al., 2007) .
This study highlights new questions about emotion regulation. How might internally focused and externally focused forms of attentional control for emotional mental representations interact to affect emotion regulation? How do individuals consciously deploy attention externally to stimuli in the environment and internally to thoughts and imagery? It is possible that individuals who are less able to disengage their attention from emotional thoughts instead rely on deploying visual attention toward positive features of the environment, such as a positive scene or happy face. The ACCE task may provide a framework with which to investigate these questions because the task-switching paradigm offers numerous ways to manipulate the demand on external and internal processes.
In conclusion, this study demonstrated that emotional attention set-shifting ability predicted the effectiveness of emotion regulation. Given the importance that the ability to deploy attention internally away from negative thoughts and imagery has for nonclinical anxiety, rumination, clinical anxiety, and depression, it is important to elucidate the mechanisms through which individuals deploy attention away from such representations. A better understanding of these mechanisms will allow clinicians to target the cognitive processes responsible for ineffective emotion regulation and psychopathology. The ACCE task provides an initial step toward identifying possible mechanisms through which individuals apply attentional control to emotional mental representations to regulate emotion.
